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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MORTGAGE INVESTMENT CO.,
INC.
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 10311

SPENCER W. TOONE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
SPENCER W. TOONE
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Spencer W. Toone, appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, upon a suit by respondent, Mortgage Investment Company, claiming monies due it under the terms of a
uniform real estate contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On June 26, 1963, the respondent filed its complaint in
the District Court, Third Judicial District. The suit was for
a money judgment under a uniform real estate contract.
A default judgment was entered and set aside. Subsequently, first and second amended complaints were filed
and on December 17, 1963 the appellant's answer to the

2
second amended complaint was filed. Subsequently, discovery was undertaken and on December 17, 1964 a pretrial order was entered by Judge Hanson, in which he took
under advisement the respondent's motion for summary
judgment. On December 22, 1964, the Court entered summary judgment. From this judgment, the appellant prosecutes this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the summary judgment
and trial on the issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant submits the following statement of facts.
The record will be cited as (R-) and the deposition of the
appellant as (D-).
The respondent, in its second amended complaint, alleged that on December 6, 1962, Northwestern Investment
Corporation and the appellant executed a uniform real
estate contract ( R-29) . The appellant further alleged that
the plaintiff was the assignee of the seller, Northwestern Investment Corporation (R-29). It was additionally alleged
that the appellant was indebted to the respondent, apparently because of the contract, in the sum of $3,919.32 for
one payment and $3,676.90 for another. Respondent sought
$1,287.00 attorney's fees (R-29). A copy of the uniform
real estate contract was attached as an exhibit to the first
complaint (R-2).
The appellant admitted the execution of the contract;
but denied the assignment and all other allegations ( R-19) ·
The appellant raised as an affirmative defense that the contract he signed was not his obligation but that of a Mr. 0. A.
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Tatro (R-19). Appellant obtained an order allowing Tatro
to be joined as a third party ( R-28) .
At the time of pretrial, the pretrial order framed as an
additional issue a claim that the respondent knew that the
appellant was not the true buyer of the property involved
in the contract and that he was acting as an agent (R-22).
The only evidence of record, in addition to the pleadings,
considered by the trial court was the deposition of the appellant, Spencer W. Toone (R-23). The deposition of the
appellant recites that he is a rancher and executed the contract with Northwestern Investment Corporation (D-2, 3).
He testified that he suspected that the appellant might purchase the contract from Northwestern when he executed it
(D-4) , but did not know of the assignment or purchase
(D-5) . He testified to executing two contracts for the same
property on different terms, but did not know why that was
done (D-12). He testified that he signed the contract as
the purchaser, but assigned it to 0. A. Tatro who was present when the contract was signed (D-9-11). The appellant admitted he had not made any payments under the
contract (D-6). No inquiry was made concerning any
knowledge of the respondent that appellant was acting as
an agent for Tatro, or whether he was in fact acting as an
agent. No evidence was produced as to the absence of a
novation or of any notice having been given to the appellant of the claimed assignment from Northwestern to Mortgage Investment Company.
Based on the above evidence, it is submitted the trial
court erred in entering summary judgment for the respondent.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RECORD FAILS TO SHOW THAT APPELLANT HAD
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLAIMED ASSIGN~vfENT
BETWEEN THE SELLER AND RESPONDENT AND THEREFORE FAILS TO PROVE APPELLANT'S DUTY TO PAY
RESPONDENT.

It is well settled that on appeal from a summary judgment the facts will be viewed most favorable to the loser
Frederick May & Co., Inc. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368'
P.2d 266, and judgment sustained only if, from the evidence
considered, it appears that there is no material dispute of
fact as to any of the issues. When so viewed the winner is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if he should otherwise prevail. Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Co-op,
11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18; Christensen v. Financial
Service Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010. If the pleading of a party is not traversed by actual evidence to the contrary, a factual dispute exists for the jury's determination.
Christensen v. Financial Service Co., supra.
The evidence in this case clearly shows that there is a
definite factual dispute as to whether the appellant was ever
notified of the alleged assignment from Northwestern to
the respondent. The appellant in his deposition expressly
denied knowing anything about the alleged assignment
(D-7). The only indication of knowledge was a men·
suspicion at the time of execution that the respondent might
purchase a contract from Northwestern (D-4). Nowhere
does the record show the date of the alleged assignment
or show any notice of assignment having been given to the
appellant.
It is well settled that before a party is bound to make contract payments to an assignee of a seller, he must have notice
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of the assignment. Thus, in 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments,
~ 96, it is stated:
"***It has been said that a debtor has the right to deal
with his creditor until he has actual notice of an assignment of the debt."
·
* * *
"The courts generally are agreed that notice to the
debtor of an assignment is necessary in order to charge
the debtor with the duty of payment to the assignee,
* * *"
Williston, Contracts, 3rd Ed.,§ 433, comments:
"The debtor should not be prejudiced by an assignment
of which he has no notice. Accordingly, 'while notice
to an obligor is not essential to the validity of an assignment as between an assignor and an assignee, until
such notice has been given, the obligor may continue to
regard the assignor as the owner of the interest or thing
assigned, whether it be a leasehold; a contract to pay
rent; a lien or charge against property; or otherwise;
the assignor remains in privity with the obligor insofar
as the performance of obligations by the latter is required under the instrument assigned.' "
This Court has recognized the general rule in Van Dyke's
Food Store v. Ind. Coal & Coke Co., 84 Utah 95, 34 P.2d
706 ( 1934) where the Court observed in an assignment
dispute:
"It is elementary that, in the absence of such notice,
defendant is not liable to plaintiff."
See also Nanny v. H. E. Pogue Distillery Co., 56 C.A.2d
817, 133 P.2d 686; Skivington v. Studer Tractor & Equip.
Co., 350 P.2d 729 (Wyo.).
Under the above rules and the evidence of this case, it is
clear that the question of the sufficiency of notice is not
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without dispute. Further, since the appellant has made
other allegations that he was a mere agent, and that a third
party was involved which raises a possible novation, it is
apparent that the question of notice and the sufficiency of
notice raise issues warranting further exploration. Mere
imputed notice is not favored. 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments,
§ 99.
Further, the pleadings show that the appellant denied
the assignment. This placed the burden of proof upon the
respondent to prove that an assignment was made prior to
the commencement of the action and that notice of the
assignment was given to the appellant. 6 Am. Jur. 2d,
Assignments, § 136, observes:
"Unless the defendants admit the assignment under
which the plaintiff claims, it is incumbent upon the
plaintiff to prove a valid assignment in order to show
that he has a cause of action.***"
* * *
"As between an assignee and the debtor, the burden of
proving that the debtor has received actual or constructive notice of the assignment so as to shift his
responsibility for performance of his obligations from
the assignor to the assignee, rests upon the assignee."
It is apparent that the record in this case does not show
the evidence to have been so conclusive and of such posture
as to warrant summary judgment.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WHERE APPELLANT CONTENDED THAT THE
RESPONDENT WAS AWARE THAT APPELLANT WAS ACTING ONLY ON BEHALF OF A THIRD PERSON IN MAKING
THE PURCHASE.

It is well settled that a person acting as an agent on behalf
of someone else, who discloses his agency, is not liable under
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a contract made on behalf of the principal. 3 Am. Jur. 2d,
Agency, ~ 294, notes:
"If a contract is made with a known agent acting within
the scope of his authority for a disclosed principal, the
contract is that of the principal alone and the agent
cannot be held liable thereon, unless credit has been
given expressly and exclusively to the agent and it
appears that it was clearly his intention to assume the
obligation as a personal liability and that he has been
informed that credit has been extended to him alone."
The Restatement of Agency 2d, ~ 320, acknowledges the
rule:

"Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract.''
This Court acknowledged the above rule in State ex rel
Public Welfare Commission v. Bonnett, 114 Utah 546. 201
P.2d 939 ( 1949).
The rule is applicable to the instant case since the pretrial order recites as an issue the claim that the respondent
and the seller were aware that the appellant was merely
acting on behalf of a third person. No evidence appears of
r<"cord that dispells this contention of the appellant. The
evidence is most sketchy concerning what was actually
intended at the time the appellant executed the contract,
which is the subject of the instant action. The full factual
circumstances surrounding the execution of the subject contract, and another contract for the same property, do not
clearly appear. Further, there may have been a contemporaneous oral agreement between the appellant, Northwestern, Tatro and the respondent that Tatro would assume all
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obligations.* This, of course, would avoid any contention
that the parole evidence rule is somehow applicable so as to
bar proof of any other arrangement. Corbin, Contracts,
§ 584; Restatement of Contracts, § 240. This being so, it is
apparent that the trial court acted hastily in granting summary judgment and the case should be remanded for trial
to allow the appellant to show the full circumstances surroundin,g the transaction.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IMPROPERLY IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE APPELLANT'S CONTENTION OF NOVATION AND
ALLOW EVIDENCE CONCERNING FACTS WHICH WOULD
SUPPORT NOVATION.

The record in the instant case discloses that the appellant
contends that by virtue of the assignment of the contract by
him to Tatro that he is no longer obligated under the contract. This, of course, could only be so if the seller, Northwestern, or its assignee agreed to look to the assignee of the
appellant. Kennedy v. Griffith, 98 Utah 183, 95 P.2d 752
( 1939). If this did occur, the appellant would not be obligated. If at the time of contract there was an oral contemporaneous agreement to relieve appellant on the contract upon his assignment to Tatro, a novation would have
occurred on assignment. 39 Am. Jur., N ovation, § 4; Davis
v. Kemp, 3 Utah 2d 16, 277 P.2d 816.
The claim of novation is clear from the nature of the pretrial order and appellant's contention. The record does not
* It is well recognized that many transactions concerning real estate invol\'e
the use of nominees. Friedman, Contracts & Conveyances of Real Property.
Section 2.2, 2nd Ed., 1963:
"As heretofore mentioned, it is familiar practice in real estate transactions
to use a nominee (sometimes called a 'dummy' or 'straw man') instead ol
the real party in interest, for one or more of the following purposes: to
sign a contract of sale, as purchaser; to take title; execute mortgage
instruments. There are many other uses for nominees, many of which art
legitimate."
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factually dispell the contention that a novation actually
occurred. Rather, there are several inferences that support
a novation: ( 1) the apparent understanding of appellant
that he was a mere nominee and would not be liable on
assignment; ( 2) the fact that the respondent was apparently involved along with Tatro in the original negotiation;
and ( 3) the fact that two contracts were executed. The
latter fact itself could be the basis for a novation and preclude an action on the instant contract. 39 Am. Jur., Novation, § 14.
It is submitted this Court should afford appellant the
right to have the factual basis of his claims determined. The
record, as it now exists, is at best sketchy and obscure. 'The
appropriate remedy is to reverse and allow a full airing of
the facts.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is a harsh remedy. Its function is to
expedite cases where there is no factual dispute between the
parties and where further proceedings would present no
basis which would alter the result. It is apparent that in the
instant case the facts surrounding several of the legal issues
raised by the appellant were not explored. The trial court's
summary action, based on the sketchy record, makes it obvious that summary judgment was inappropriate. There
are factual matters which still require exploration. This
Court should reverse and allow the appellant an opportunity to have his case determined at trial.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM J. CAYIAS
405 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

